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Summary
This report reviews several decades of global
experience in transferring management of
government-run irrigation systems to farmer
associations or other nongovernment agencies in
an attempt to apply the lessons of success to the
African smallholder irrigation context. Based on a
comparative study of the experience of several
countries, analysts have suggested that Irrigation
Management Transfer (IMT) works provided
certain preconditions are met, viz., supportive
legal-policy framework; secure water rights; local
management capacity building; and an enabling
process to facilitate management transfer. This
paper reasons, however, that straightforward
IMT—even with all these conditions fulfilled—is
unlikely to work in the African smallholder context.
It suggests that institutional alternatives most likely
to work in this context are those that successfully
deal with the entire complex of constraints facing
African smallholders and help them move to a
substantially higher trajectory of productivity and
income from where they can absorb the
additional cost and responsibility of managing
their irrigation systems. In developing such
institutional alternatives, rather than focusing
only on direct transfer of irrigation management,
African governments need to begin by enhancing
the wealth-creating potential of smallholder
irrigated farming by strengthening market
access, promoting high-value crops, and
improving systems for providing extension and
technical support to smallholder irrigators.1
Institutional Alternatives in African Smallholder
Irrigation: Lessons from International Experience with
Irrigation Management Transfer
Tushaar Shah, Barbara van Koppen, Douglas Merrey, Marna de Lange
and Madar Samad
Review of International Experience
Irrigation management reform has a history of
more than 50 years. It has gathered momentum
during the past 20 years. Irrigation management
reforms are a key component of government
policy in almost all countries with a significant
irrigation sector. The overall experience has
been varied and mixed in the approach adopted
in designing and implementing the reform, the
extent of the reform, and the impacts of reform on
irrigation system performance as well as on
farmers. Since the mid-1980s, the centerpiece of
the reforms invariably has been the transfer of
management (in rare cases, along with the
ownership) of irrigation systems—wholly or in
part—to Water Users Associations (WUAs) or
other nongovernmental agencies, combined with
the downsizing or withdrawal of the government
role in operation and maintenance (O&M), fee
collection, water management and conflict-resolution.
The driving force behind the reforms is the
need to reduce the government’s recurrent
expenditures for irrigation. Irrigation systems in
many developing countries were established
with substantial financial contributions from
international donors. It was assumed that
enhanced financial gains from improvements in
productivity levels of irrigated agriculture would
enable the government or water users to meet
the O&M costs of the systems. This assumption
has very often proved unfounded; public
irrigation systems in developing countries have
seldom performed to their design potential.
Many schemes have failed to generate returns
commensurate with expectations. Moreover, in
most developing countries, governments have
failed to set up irrigation charges that cover
actual O&M costs and even more so in
collecting these charges.
Some of the key stated and unstated
assumptions underlying the recent reforms are:
a. government management is neither a viable
nor an ideal and sustainable approach to
managing irrigation projects;
b. most irrigation schemes are, in principle,
financially and economically viable or have
the potential to be so under reasonable
management;
c. transferring the management of irrigation
systems, partly or wholly to WUAs, would
result in better O&M of the systems,
improved water management, conflict-resolution,
improved fee collection, and enhanced
productivity of land and also contribute to
food and livelihood security of the farmers
in the schemes;2
d. management transfer takes time and
requires capacity building, and succeeds to
the extent the enabling conditions
(“supportive socio-technical context,” legal
framework, water rights, and so on) are in
place to ensure their success ( see
Vermillion 1996; Vermillion and Sagardoy
1999; Frederiksen and Vissia 1998).
Early arguments in favor of irrigation
management transfer (IMT) were based, in part,
on the reported successes with private
irrigation.  It is widely documented that, at least
in Asia, private pump irrigation from
groundwater and surface water bodies is far
more productive and financially viable compared
to public irrigation systems Dhawan 1990,
Kolawalli and Chicoine 1989, Shah 1993.  Many
others have shown that private small-scale
pump irrigation—from groundwater and surface
water sources—is several times more
productive compared to canal irrigation and is
almost always financially viable and self-
governing. Lowdermilk et al. (1978) report
similar results for Pakistan. There are also
examples of privately catalyzed collective
management: Farmer-managed irrigation
schemes (FMIS) in the hills of South Asia,
tubewell companies in north Gujarat, lift
irrigation schemes built and managed by sugar
cooperatives in Maharashtra, deep tubewell
cooperatives in northwestern Bangladesh—all of
which show that well-managed collective
irrigation by farmers lies at the heart of a
process of transforming their livelihoods (Tang
1992; Lam, Lee and Ostrom 1997). In the Sahel
too, Brown and Nooter (1992) wrote for the
World Bank that “most successful irrigation in
Africa has been done by private individuals.”
Much of the early discussions envisaged
that farmer management of public irrigation
systems would enhance their performance and
bring about wide-ranging socioeconomic
changes that would enable farmers to
substantially improve farm incomes. In more
recent years, management transfer was
considered to be beneficial even if it just
saved the government money, improved
cost-effectiveness of operation and maintenance
while improving, or at least not weakening, the
productivity of irrigated agriculture (Vermillion
1996). The drift of the IMT discussion, in recent
times, has been more towards getting irrigation
off the back of governments than towards
improving the lot of the farmers and the poor,
the original goal to which much public irrigation
investment was directed over the past 50 years.
Numerous case studies of the process and
impact of management transfer are now
available. There are also some attempts at
synthesis and review of recent research on the
subject (Vermillion 1996; Fredericksen and
Vissia 1998; Vermillion and Sagardoy 1999).
These deal mainly with two aspects, the impact
of IMT and the conditions that increase the
chances of its success, and almost always
assume that successful management transfer
to user organizations is in principle viable
provided the “process” is right and favorable
socio-technical, legal and political conditions are
created ( Vermillion 1996; Fredericksen and
Vissia 1998; Vermillion and Sagardoy 1999).
Interest in IMT has been growing despite
moderate expectations about impacts. However,
global experience with IMT has been far from
uniform and reassuring, especially in low-income
societies. An exhau,stive review of IMT impacts
in several countries by Vermillion (1996), a
pioneer in IMT research, for example, conveyed
a mixed picture. The IMT programs in Turkey,
Mexico, USA, and New Zealand are considered
as successful examples. Elsewhere, especially
in the developing world, the picture is less
clear. Different performance indicators show
improvement in some schemes and countries
but a decline in others. Major reductions in
government staff were reported in the
Philippines, Columbia basin of the USA, Mexico3
and in Colombia. In some countries, there has
been an increase in O&M charges borne by
farmers, especially in pump schemes, improved
cost-effectiveness of irrigation, improved
collection of water fees, and diversification of
income sources for WUAs. However, major
maintenance has often tended to be deferred
even in some of the more successful cases,
including those in high-income countries. For
example, in Turkey, one of the prominent
“temples” of management turnover, there were
“indications that farmers may tend to
underinvest in the long-term physical
sustainability of infrastructure” (Editor’s note to
Svendsen and Nott 1997). Where this has not
happened, fee collection often became an end in
itself. Panella (1999) notes that in the
Philippines, a pioneer in irrigation management
transfer, the key achievement of 20 years of
IMT has been improved fee collection
performance. Despite this, the National Irrigation
Administration (NIA), the high profile agency
that managed IMT, has not become truly viable.
Over half of its operating budget is covered by
hidden donor subsidies (ibid, p.13). NIA’s
emphasis on viability has led to extreme cost
cutting, severe underinvestment in operation and
maintenance, and staff orientation towards
collection at the expense of operation and
maintenance” (ibid, p.37; also see Hayami and
Kikuchi 2000; and Fujita, Hayami and Kikuchi nd).
The impact of management transfer on
agricultural productivity and farm incomes is
equally unequivocal. In the Dominican Republic,
farmers realized increased yields of 40 percent.
In Mexico, there was no change; and in Senegal
valley, there was a decline in cropping intensity
and expanded irrigated area. Improved water
delivery to middle-reach and tail-end farmers
was reported in the Kano Project in Nigeria and
in Bihar, India in the early years after transfer.
But the gradual dissipation in performance gains
over the years suggests it may take a long time
for the culture of collective self-management to
take hold in contexts where dependency on
parastatals has long been part of farmers’ lives.
A study by Vermillion et al. (1999:2) of
Indonesia’s 10-year old program of turning over
small-scale pump irrigation schemes in West
and Central Java—where agricultural
productivity was already quite high (with paddy
yields ranging from 5.2–6.2 tons/ha) concluded
that the management transfer did not increase
irrigation costs to farmers, nor lead to a decline
in the quality of irrigation service; but no
significant productivity improvements were
achieved. Similar results were noted elsewhere
(see, for example, Johnson III 1997, Kloezen,
Garces-Restrepo and Johnson III 1997 and
Kloezen and Garces-Restrepo 1998 for the
Mexican experience and Samad and Vermillion
1999 for the Sri Lankan experience).
Many overarching patterns that seem to
emerge from a reading of the international
experience with IMT seem relevant to Africa,
but have not received adequate attention in the
literature. IMT has tended to be smooth,
relatively effortless and successful where:
irrigation is central to a dynamic, high-performing
agriculture; average farm size is large enough
for a typical or a significant proportion of
farmers in the command area to operate like
agri-businessmen; backward linkages with input
supply systems and forward linkages with
output marketing systems are strong and well-
developed; and the costs of self-managed
irrigation are an insignificant part of the gross
value of product of farming. These conditions
prevail in Mexico, Turkey, USA, and New
Zealand  where IMT has been a success.
Counter-intuitively, many situations where IMT
seems to have succeeded are also marked by
highly unequal distribution of land ownership. In
the Andean region of Colombia where IMT has
been successful, farmers mostly grow
commercial crops—mainly banana and oil4
palm—for the external market.  About 66
percent of the farms in this region are 5 hectares
or less in extent; however, some 40 percent of
the land is owned by 2.8 percent of the farmers
each owning 50 hectares or more (Ramirez and
Vargas 1999:14).
In South Africa, numerous Irrigation
Boards—Water Users Associations par
excellence—have managed irrigation systems
successfully for long; but their members are all
white, commercial, large farmers operating
profitable well-capitalized farms. In Turkey,
40 percent of the irrigated area consists of farm
holdings that are 5–20 hectares in extent and
where farmers cultivate high-value crops for
export to Europe. It can be argued that in
Turkey IMT succeeded because, as with South
African Irrigation Boards, in many respects,
there was a 40-year tradition of farmer
participation in the maintenance of the canal
system through informal village-level
organizations. Equally, irrigation fees under
self-management in Turkey are 2 percent or
less of the value of production per hectare,
3.5 percent or less of the total variable cost of
cultivation and less than 6 percent of gross
margin (Svendsen and Nott 1997:14). In South
Asia where smallholder farming dominates, the
experience is mixed.  A good example of a
successful IMT-cum-rehabilitation in small farmer
context is the Panchkanya System in Nepal (see
Starkloff et al. 1999). In this system, following
management transfer, the area commanded
increased to 600 hectares against the design
command of 420 hectares. Prior to transfer the
area commanded was 270 hectares.  Farmers
in the scheme perceived that crop yields
increased after transfer. The area under cash
crops too increased. A notable development
following the transfer was the increase in farmer
participation in decision making and management
at all levels. Nepal hills have other such examples
of successful farmer management of irrigation.
The relatively high performance of farmer
management in South Asian hill irrigation
schemes may be attributed to the tradition of
collective self-management of irrigation that
prevailed here for several hundred years. The
Panchkanya system itself was originally built
115 years ago by the Tharu community, which
also operated it as a Farmer-managed Irrigation
System (FMIS) until the Department of Irrigation
built a pucca head-works and took over its
management.  About 84 percent of the holdings
in the scheme’s command are owner-operated.
A majority of WUA members are full-time
farmers, deriving all or a very substantial part
of their livelihood from irrigated farming.  There
is a critical mass of medium-sized holdings that
range from 1 hectare to 20 hectares. The design
of the WUA too contributes to performance:
shares are issued in proportion to land owned
and, water allocation is linked to shares owned
and is ensured only to members in good
standing, that is, who pay up their dues and
contribute to maintenance and repair works.
Finally, and importantly, the volume of the
benefits that membership of the scheme offers
is much greater than the irrigation fees. All that
a member has to pay is a one-time entry fee of
less than US$2 to enroll and an annual
maintenance fee of around US$7 or three
man-days of labor!
1 Against this, all members
take three irrigated crops every year for water
charges ranging from US$1.5–3.00 per hectare.
This largely explains the high demand for
shares in the Panchkanya scheme.
In general, then, IMT has worked in situations
where individual stakes are high and the irrigation
community has been able to take the additional
burden of self-management—financial and
managerial—in its stride. This ability is strongly
1Notably, 70 percent of members prefer to pay up rather than work, which is an indirect indication that the opportunity cost of landowners’ labor
exceeds Nepal R 100/day (US$1.00 = Nepal R 69.00).5
linked with the microeconomics of irrigated
production, which propel the economy upward
by generating powerful incentives for
self-management. In sum, international experience
with IMT suggests that four conditions must be met
before a farming community makes success of an
IMT intervention:
1. it must hold out the promise of a significant
net improvement in life-situations for a
significant proportion of members,
2. the irrigation system must be central to
creating such improvement,
3. the economic and financial cost of
sustainable self-management must be an
acceptably small proportion of improved
income, and
4. the proposed organization design must
have—and be seen to have—low transaction
costs.
All these conditions are met by South
Africa’s irrigation boards, as well as by canal
irrigators in the US and New Zealand. In Turkey,
sufficient proportion of irrigators who are
commercial exporters are willing to be the
“champions” of farmer management, as is the
case for many Latin American countries. One
might suggest that the prospects for IMT are
bright even in the Pakistan Punjab on a
somewhat perverse logic; with its large
inequalities in landholdings, large landholders in
the Indus system who make a decent living
from farming would produce the champions
needed to make IMT succeed, even if through
oligarchic WUAs. But a hard look at any
smallholder IMT program in Asia or Africa will
show that it satisfies none of these conditions;
therefore, it is not surprising that small farmers
here are lukewarm to IMT of government-built
systems.
 IMT faces problems in smallholder
communities not because they are less able or
less cooperative but partly because most of
them are not full-fledged farmers and more
importantly, because the management cost of a
government-built irrigation system—like most
service institutions—increases more rapidly with
the number of customers than with the volume
of business. A 1,500-hectare system that serves
1,500 irrigators costs much more to manage—in
terms of the logistics of service delivery, fee
collection, maintenance, and so on—than a
similar system that serves 5 large farmers.
Moreover, it is a lot easier for 5 large farmers
to come together and agree to the rules of
self-management than for 1,500 smallholders to
do. This broader perspective should be taken
into account in our assessment of the prospects
of successful management transfer of
government irrigation schemes to African
smallholder communities, who in some ways are
worse off compared to South Asian smallholders.
African Smallholder Irrigation Context
In many aspects, the sub-Saharan African
smallholder situation differs from situations
where IMT worked and was sustained. Some of
these aspects are discussed below.
History of Dependency
The discussion of IMT in the African context, in
recent years, began with management reforms6
that entailed drastic curtailment of the functions
of the parastatal agencies that were responsible
for the provision of support services and
management of irrigation schemes. Examples of
such paratstatal agencies include the Agriculture
and Rural Development Corporation (ARDC) in
the Northern Province of the Republic of South
Africa (RSA), the White Nile Agricultural
Services Administration (WNASA) in Sudan, and
the Society for Land Management and
Development of the Senegal and Falme River
Valley (SAED) in Senegal (Wester et al. 1995).
Although they are smallholder irrigation
schemes, the parastatal agencies managed
them in an “estate mode” in which they
centralized input supply and output marketing
functions to such an extent that farmers often
got reduced to being workers on their own land.
In South Africa, for instance, the ARDC and
its predecessors have, for over 30 years,
managed smallholder irrigation schemes through
an elaborate top-down command and support
system, which has eventually proved to be
unsustainable. Under a version of contract
farming system, irrigation was fully subsidized.
The ARDC organized mechanized cultivation,
planting and fertilizer application. All that the
plot-holders or farmers did was weed, harvest
and move the irrigation pipes around. They did
not invest much working capital; nor did they
need to make any decisions about farm
management. The parastatal also organized the
marketing of pooled produce. It deducted all its
expenses and the residual sum was given to
the farmers. Under this arrangement the plot-
holders are neither farmers nor wage-laborers.
They do not take any entrepreneurial or
managerial decisions. In reality, they only
collect wages for weeding and harvesting and
managing field irrigation. However, they share
the risk of crop yield variability, and in that
sense, are not pure wage-laborers.
2 As
Bembridge (1999:11) notes: “Scheme managers
have been attempting to ‘manage’ farmers rather
than encouraging entrepreneurial development.”
The situation was similar in other African countries.
The abrupt withdrawal of parastatal agencies
from the management of irrigation schemes and
the elaborate institutional support systems they
provided has had serious impacts on
smallholder farmers in many African countries.
3
In the Arabie-Olifants scheme in the Northern
Province of South Africa, the gross cropped
area declined to 30 percent of the total arable
land a year after the withdrawal of ARDC as
plot-holders were unable to mobilize working
capital to pay for inputs and services (Shah and
van Koppen 1999). Attempts were made to
obtain crop loans from the Land Bank.  Although
the bank agreed in principle to provide loans,
the farmers were not provided credit as they did
not have legal claim to their lands;
4 and the
Bank was unwilling to accept other forms of
loan guarantees.
2As a World Bank study on the organization of settlement farming in West Africa concluded: “Problems are encountered  … when the so called
‘farmers’ are settled on centrally managed estates, where the ‘farmer’ has no decision making power, yet carries the risks of failure.”
3For example, the Northern Province ADRC’s budget has been reduced progressively over the past 3 years: from R 90 million in 1997-98 to
R 45 million and to R 23 million in the current year. ARDC had a staff of 1,200. It has been cultivating some 120,000 hectares of government
farms besides providing a range of services to farmers. Its salary bill alone was R 22 million. As a result, the ARDC had to levy a fairly high
service charge on the farmers.
4Banks would not lend because land under communal tenure is no use as collateral. Plot owners do not have rights to dispose of their land to
settle their obligations. As an alternative, the Land Bank in South Africa has recently initiated a “step-up loan,” which is given without collateral. It
starts at US$36 per person and is paid back in monthly installments. Once it is repaid, the person can borrow double the amount, etc. up to a
ceiling of US$2,570. However, agricultural loans require higher initial amounts and seasonal rather than the monthly repayments required for
step-up loans.7
In many African countries the management
of smallholder irrigation schemes by parastatal
agencies have left behind a legacy of a
dependent and impoverished group of farmers.
5
In many situations, such management had
degenerated into oppressive “spoils systems”
that destroyed all pre-existing informal
institutions. Nowhere is this more vivid than in
the descriptions of the Mwea irrigation and
settlement scheme in Kenya.  The scheme
showed signs of success in the early period of
its establishment. But, over time
mismanagement of the scheme by the National
Irrigation Board (NIB) led to the impoverishment
of the farming community whose earnings were
barely sufficient to satisfy basic subsistence
needs (Muchai 2000a and Muchai 2000b).
Management transfer should have left Mwea
farmers rejoicing but the reality was they were
miserable. As Muchai (2000a: 21) noted, “as
much as the farmers loathe the NIB, replacing it
has proven to be tall order. The demands of
running the scheme are far greater than the
monetary cost.”
High Cash Costs due to Mechanization
Smallholder irrigated farming in Africa emerged
as a highly mechanized and capital-intensive
activity under parastatal management. The
ARDC in South Africa used heavy equipment for
ploughing and land preparation, spraying and
harvesting. With the withdrawal of parastatal
management hiring farm machinery and
equipment at affordable rates has become a
major problem. The development of equipment
rental markets at the local level has been slow
and variable. The rental rates are high.  As a
result, the rising cost of production has not only
eroded the margin from irrigated farming but has
also increased working capital requirements.
Most importantly, the high fixed costs have
made smallholder farming extremely risky, with
net gains plummeting far more rapidly than
yields in a bad year.
In the Arabie-Olifants scheme of South
Africa, net incomes (excluding electricity) for
wheat computed from ARDC records tended to
be 20–25 percent of the cash costs of farming,
which is less than the interest charged by
private money lenders for short-term loans to
farmers. In the same scheme, farm budgets
computed by Tren and Schurr (2000) showed
that gross margins per hectare of wheat and
maize were a mere US$2 (R 14) and US$289
(R 2,021), respectively. Besides, these small
farms face much higher “operating leverage”
6
compared to Asian smallholders because the
latter incur much lower cash costs. As a result,
net income per hectare shows extremely high
variability with respect to changes in yields.
According to a document from South Africa’s
Department of Water Affairs and Forestry, for
example, gross margins per hectare of maize,
onions and potatoes are R 408, R 1,487 and R
5,739, respectively, at normal yields. But they
reduce to R 0 at 50 percent yields; and for
tomatoes, the gross margin falls from R 13,227/
ha to a mere R 765/ha with the halving of the
yield/ha!
Absence of Credit, Input and Output
Markets
Most smallholder schemes in South Africa are
located in former homelands in remote areas
away from towns and cities with which they
often have poor linkages. With the rise of the
5For the Nigerian experience in this respect, see Ogunwale, Maurya and Owonubi 1994.
6‘Operating Leverage, the opposite of break-even volume, is defined as fixed costs (contribution/ha).  For the Asian smallholder, a crop failure
implies wasted human and animal labor both of which have low opportunity cost, but no major cash costs from borrowed funds. For a comparable
African small farmer, a failed crop is significant cash loss and the risk of falling into a debt-trap.8
“estate mode” of farming under parastatals,
such markets, as existed previously, gradually
disappeared; and now that the parastatals have
withdrawn, there is a huge institutional vacuum.
Based on a field assessment of the prospects
of IMT in Dingleydale and New Forest, two of
the better schemes in the Northern Province of
South Africa, Merle and Oudot wrote: “Access
to inputs is difficult. A lot of farmers fetch them
from Hoedspruit or Hazyview with important
transportation costs. Hiring a bakkie (small
pickup truck) for 20 bags of fertilizer costs
between R 100 and R 150 (US$14–21).”
Moreover, “Traditional markets that were
available seem to have disappeared. The
farmers are nowadays in direst need of markets
especially for the winter crops. A lot of
vegetables get rotten in the fields due to lack of
buyers. The potential of the area for subtropical
fruit trees must be accompanied by
corresponding markets.”
Land Tenure Issues
One conclusion of international IMT research
suggests that for farmer management to work, it
is important to assign clear water rights. In the
African smallholder context, besides water
rights, land rights pose an additional intricate
challenge (Lahiff 1999). Insecure tenure limits
farmer incentives to make long-term
development investments on their land
(Bembridge 1999). Moreover, the present
arrangement does not provide much room and
incentive for uninterested farmers to sell out,
and to interested and capable ones to expand
their holdings (ibid.). Nor does it lead to the
emergence of flexible rental markets in irrigated
land, thus keeping it from achieving its full
productive potential.
7 As already mentioned the
inability to offer land as collateral for obtaining
credit is another disadvantage. Often, the lack
of clarity among the plot-holders about what
their rights precisely are with respect to their
plots seems more problematic than the absence
of ownership. In Dingleydale and New-Forest
Schemes in the Northern Province of South
Africa, Merle and Oudot (nd), noted: “Some
farmers do not know if they are allowed to rent
their land, and are unwilling to discuss the
matter in any detail. Some people are very
reluctant to let someone crop on their field
because they are afraid not to be able to get it
back. The land is lent to a trustful person, such
as an influential person, friend or relative.”
In different ways, tenure uncertainty does
enter into the discussion of IMT in African
smallholder irrigation. In a study of the transfer
of pump irrigation schemes in Niger, Abernethy
et al. (2000:8) found lack of clarity about land
rights an important issue and noted: “The
precise ownership rights on the irrigated lands
remain unclear. Former owners dispute the
action of a past government in taking over their
land without compensation. The present users of
the land are not true owners, since they cannot
sell the land if they wish to do so. The
irrigators’ organizations are, to some degree, in
the position of owners of the land, since they
can charge the irrigators a fee for using it and
can evict and replace irrigators in certain
circumstances.” In Zimbabwe, under the Control
of Irrigable Area Regulations of 1970, every
plot-holder is issued three permits, which have
to be renewed every year: a permit to reside,
7Land tenure is a major institutional issue, which has important implications for irrigation management institutions in Africa. In principle, farmlands
are communally owned but, especially in irrigation schemes, state influence is overpowering. Within customary arrangements, farmers feel they
have secure tenure on the plots assigned to them, as emerged in the Arabie-Olifants Scheme study by Lahiff (1999) and Mpahlele et al. (1999).
In a more wide-ranging review, Rukuni (1997) suggests that communal ownership of land and the present tenurial arrangements would promote
productivity and efficiency enhancement if only the communal ownership was secure. In his assessment, problems of tenurial insecurity arise
primarily because when communal land tends to be viewed as state-owned, it gives every bureaucrat the power to intervene at will and tinker
with the communal lands.9
another to graze their stock and yet another to
cultivate. Withholding the issue of permits is a
powerful instrument for securing the compliance
of farmers (Manzungu et al. 1999:6).
Irrigated Holding Size and Smallholder
Hedgehog Behavior
Literature documenting international IMT
experience suggests that all or a majority of
farmers in successful IMT cases are full-time
farmers deriving a substantial proportion of their
livelihoods from irrigated farming. This builds
their stake in self-management and committing
time and resources to it. In the African
smallholder context, farmers who work tiny plots
are forced to pursue what Chambers (1983)
calls the “hedgehog strategy” of depending on a
variety of sources to earn a livelihood. In
Senegal’s Village Irrigation Schemes (Périmètres
Irrigués Villageoises), the plot size varies from
0.1–0.4 hectare (Wester et al. 1995:3). In a
sample of smallholder schemes studied of the
Niger valley, the plot size was 0.25 hectare or
less (Abernethy and Sally 1999). In the
Nyanyadzi scheme in Zimbabwe, it ranges from
0.76 to 1.1 hectares (Manzungu et al. 1999). In
the five schemes proposed for rehabilitation in
the Northern Province of South Africa, the plot
size is about 1 hectare (NPDALE 1999). In the
Arabie-Olifants scheme studied by IWMI and
partners, barring a few farmers, most work
1.25-hectare plots and a much larger number of
tiny food plots and vegetable gardens as in
Sepitsi (Shah and Van Koppen 1999; also see
Mpahlele et al. 1999). In South Africa as a
whole, of the total of 37,108 farmers involved on
202 smallholder schemes in the former
homelands of Lebowa, Ciskei, Transkei,
Kwazulu, Venda, Gazankulu, Bophuthatswana,
Qwaqwa, as well as Kangwane and
KwaNdebele, 63 percent are tiny food plot
cultivators, mostly women farmers.
Inability to depend upon irrigated farming for
a substantial proportion of their livelihood needs
modifies the incentives and behavior of the
smallholders. It is common for men to seek
urban jobs while the women cultivate the plots.
The smaller the plot, the stronger this tendency
(Mpahlele et al. 1999; Ngqaleni and Makhura
1996). Many plot-holders keep cultivating their
plots until they are too old to work them. In the
Arabie-Olifants Scheme, a large number of
plot-owners depend on pensions as the main
source of income. In a rural community in
Northern Province studied by J Kirsten (cited in
NPDALE 1999), 75 percent of the households
earned income from cropping but this amounted
to just 5.8 percent of their total income.
Nevertheless 66 percent got remittances, which
constituted 33 percent of the total income. In
Niger’s river lift irrigation schemes with 0.25-
hectare plots, Abernethy and Sally (1999) found
irrigated farming on these is just one of the
several livelihood activities farmers pursue,
including rain-fed farming, animal husbandry,
fishing, trading, and government jobs. A
household survey in Saga irrigation scheme in
Niger reported that barely 25 percent of net
household income depended on irrigated farming
(Abernethy et al. 2000:8). In a study of
smallholder irrigation in Zimbabwe, Manzungu
et al. (1999:31) noted: “A variety of livelihood
strategies based partly on irrigated farming,
partly on dry land cultivation, migrant labor,
gardening and sub-leasing of plots has
emerged.”
This has many implications. First, plot-
holders are often more interested in keeping
their plots as insurance rather than working
them to their full productivity potential.
According to Crosby (2000), a South African
observer,  “Their plots are some sort of security
although few are interested in active farming …
there is danger of losing their holdings if they
do not use them.” Second, there are stringent
limits on the amount of investment of time, effort10
and resources a typical smallholder irrigator might
be willing and able to make on activities
associated with the irrigated plot if it involves
sacrificing other livelihood options. Third, the
large number of members, even on a small
scheme, would greatly increase the invisible
“transaction costs” of collective
self-management—such as of fee collection,
responding to complaints, delivering water to
each user, extracting consensus on key
decisions, of checking “wanton irrigator
misbehavior of blocking canals, cutting off
embankments, illegal lifting of water by pumps
or siphons and breakage of control structures”
(Ogunwale, Maurya and Owonubi 1994:11)—all
invisible costs that vary directly with the
number of irrigators served by the scheme and
inversely with the average landholding.
High Cost of Pump Schemes
African smallholders seem to have got more
than their fair share of pump irrigation schemes,
which are more costly and difficult to operate
and maintain than gravity schemes. As outlined
earlier, an aspect of successful IMT experience
worldwide is that operation and maintenance
costs are an insignificant proportion of total
income—typically less than 5 percent of the
gross income from farming. In many African
pump irrigation schemes, this proportion is far
higher.  If the Arabie-Olifants scheme were to
be turned over to farmers in today’s conditions,
running it would cost 20–25 percent of the total
value of irrigated output the scheme produces
(Shah and van Koppen 1999).
In the Nyanyadzi scheme in Zimbabwe,
maintenance fees introduced in 1984 were a
whopping Z$145 per hectare, way above the
highest we hear about in Asia, and yet covered
less than one quarter of the operation and
maintenance costs (Manzungu et al. 1999:16).
In Nigeria, where farmers paid 100 Naira per
hectare (US$52) towards the irrigation fee,
Ogunwale et al. (1994:11) found “frequent
breakdown of pumps and sprinkler lines and
poor availability of spare parts” to be one of the
key reasons for the decline of smallholder
schemes after government withdrawal. In
Senegal Valley’s small-scale pump schemes
studied by Wester et al. (1995:8), the only
pump mechanic left, after the parastatal SAED
fired its team, established a pump repair and
maintenance monopoly on which 55 pump
schemes became dependent. Farmers had to go
350 km to
Saint-Louis or 650 km to Dakar to obtain spare
parts. Farmers did form some kind of
“maintenance associations” but “increased need
for cash led to organizational problems within
farmer groups and long delays in getting the
pump engine repaired” (ibid, p. 8). Wester et al.
(1995) noted: “All farmer groups interviewed
stated that their engines are breaking down
more often. None of them is actually saving
money to buy a new pump engine.”
In a recent analysis of smallholder schemes
in Burkina Faso and Niger, Abernethy and Sally
(1999) estimated that in the five Burkinabe
schemes, all of them gravity, the water fee
ranged from 4.6 to 18.6 percent of the gross
value of product (with a mode of around 5.5
percent) but in four schemes in Niger, all
pump-based, the ratio ranged from 12 to 22
percent with a modal value of around 18
percent (ibid, p. 220). And even after paying
such high fees, Abernethy and Sally (1999)
concluded that “none of the nine organizations
which have been studied in the two countries
seem to be sustainable in the long run,
because none can undertake necessary major
maintenance and renewals of equipment or
facilities” (ibid, p. 216). If net income is 20–25
percent of the gross income and if irrigation
fees under self-management are as high as
15–20 percent of gross income, the
implications are that most turned-over pump11
schemes would leave the farmer in the red,
unless gross income increased substantially
before the turnover.
Despite this, pump schemes offer a window
of opportunity for farmer management because,
if maintained well, they offer better quality
irrigation and also, by their design, they help
impose a certain financial discipline. Gravity
systems generally cost more to build but less
to run than pump schemes. However,  many
invisible transaction costs involved in farmer
management of gravity systems probably tilt
the balance in the other direction. As
Abernethy and Sally (1999) record, as fuel
costs are recurring and have to be paid fast,
the Niger pump schemes have evolved more
formal accounting and book keeping systems,
but the Burkinabe gravity systems are quite
primitive in their financial management and,
therefore, have serious sustainability problems.
Every time flooding occurs, the irrigators turn
to government for doles and are unable to
internally generate the resources needed. In
general, with a favorable economic
environment and high land and water
productivity, pump schemes, though costlier to
run, may well be more amenable to farmer
management than gravity schemes because
the transaction costs of the latter are high
(ibid, p.210). The problem in African
smallholder pump schemes is that they cannot
use the unique managerial advantages offered
by pump schemes because of low farm
productivity and income.
Downward Ratchets
8After “ratchet effects” used by Robert Chambers to describe how the operation of multiple constraints disable poor people “like movements
down past a cog which are difficult or impossible to reverse, making poor people permanently poorer.” (Chambers 1983: 115).
9For example, writing about the state of Nigerian smallholder systems, Oguwale et al. (1994) note: “The government (did) not only operate and
maintain these schemes but provid (ed) the agro-support services such as land preparation, seeds, fertilizers and chemicals to farmers. Farmers
virtually (had) no role to play except to divert water from channels and operate their respective farms …  The interaction between farmers and
government could be classified as a benevolent patron-client relationship. The governments have particularly withdrawn from providing funds
and services  since 1988, and the managing agencies  are expected to be self-sufficient and self-sustaining. The dwindling operating funds and
the government’s abrupt withdrawal have contributed to serious deterioration of most systems’ structures.”
Crosby, Charles (2000) reviewing the prospects
of smallholder irrigation in the Northern
Province, South Africa, writes: “It is unbelievable
that with the exception of sugar projects there
are virtually no schemes that have been
successful ... (and) the pattern of failure is so
similar that it is not really necessary to
undertake a needs analysis for individual
projects” (ibid, chap. 9). This similar pattern of
failure is what we refer to as “downward
ratchets.”
8 The overall microeconomic dynamic
is such that piecemeal interventions with
marginal benefits will, most likely, fail to relaunch
the smallholder schemes into a significantly
higher trajectory of productivity and farm incomes
from where the irrigation community  can take
the additional costs and effort of self-
management in their stride. In Crosby’s (2000)
analysis, the downward ratchets are evident in
the “common aspects (which) are: total
dependence water   supply infrastructure
dilapidated   ineffective water management   low
production levels little knowledge of crop
production or Irrigation  ineffective
extension lack of markets and credit difficulty
in sourcing inputs expensive and ineffective
mechanization services  unrepaired
fencing damaged soils.” (ibid, p. 3).
Other observers have concluded similarly on
conditions elsewhere in South Africa and Africa
as a whole
9 and found that farmers in
smallholder schemes need and want support12
systems that go far beyond just irrigation, if
they are to significantly improve their
livelihoods. In their interaction with Nigerian
smallholders, Ogunwale et al. (1994) found that
“farmers viewed the availability of other
agricultural inputs and services (especially
fertilizers, tractors and harvesters) as more
important to them than irrigation water or
irrigation systems’ effectiveness.” Based on
focus-group discussions with nine groups of
small-scale irrigation farmers in Free State,
Mukhala and Groeneweld (Mukhura and
Mamabolo 2000) concluded: “Although they are
highly motivated to become prosperous farmers,
they need considerable land, funding, extension
marketing and credit services.” A study of 66
households from Sepitsi and Veeplaats farms of
the Arabie-Olifants smallholder irrigation scheme
by Maluleke (Mukhura and Mamabolo 2000)
found that “farmers with access to credit (2.5 ha
and 5 ha farmers) produced and sold more than
the food plot farmers who did not receive
credit;” and that “lack of extension, poor
infrastructure and institutional support for input
supply and marketing, expensive equipment
services, lack of entrepreneurial skills, lack of
credit and poor irrigation services were major
constraints to smallholder development.”
Many observers focus on the high
productivity of tiny holdings and this is
supported by a good deal of empirical evidence.
A case study of the Rural Women’s Association
in Northern Province, South Africa, shows the
value of the productivity per hectare to be
remarkable for manually irrigated vegetable
crops on 100 square meter plots (IWMI 2000).
Similarly, Mpahlele et al. (1999) estimate the
gross margin per hectare of vegetable crops to
be R 8,800–20,500/ha for tiny food plot owners
but less than R 600/ha for wheat and R 1,500
for maize for 2.5 ha and 5 ha farmers (US$1=R 7).
Rukuni (1997) also lays a great deal of
emphasis on high productivity of intensively
worked smallholdings. Nobody can gainsay this
internationally supported negative relationship
between farm size and productivity. The point is
that smallholder irrigated farming income per
household for food plot owners as well as so
called small-scale commercial farmers remains
too low for them to meet all their subsistence
requirements and generate the surplus needed
for development.  As a result, food plot farmers
who achieve high productivity as well as
2.5-hectare plot-owners who do not “could be
classified as poor or vulnerable to poverty” with
their average household income hovering around
R 740 (US$106) per month, the South African
poverty line (Mpahlele et al. 1999: 23). The
issue in making a success of IMT in African
smallholder irrigation thus is not getting the
“process right” or getting laws and rights right
but, in addition, of devising a “lift strategy” to
replace the downward ratchets by upward ones.
Consider the Sudanese experience that
IWMI has studied in some detail (see, for
example, Narayanamurthy et al. 1997). Like the
Northern Province of South Africa, Sudan too
has over 250 smallholder irrigation schemes
along the White Nile and Blue Nile serving
some 200,000 tenant farmers. Since 1982,
farming in these schemes has been managed
as a three-way partnership with the state
providing land and water, the White Nile
Agricultural Services Administration (WNASA), a
parastatal, providing inputs and services, and
tenant-farmers providing labor and being the
“residual claimants.” 
10 In response to a
declining economy, in 1991, 70 percent of the
staff of the White Nile Agricultural Services
Administration (WNASA) was retrenched. The
10This arrangement has perpetuated and reinforced the “downward ratchets” not only in smallholder schemes but even in the much-admired
Gezira scheme where farmers accumulated a debt of over US$1 million to the Gezira Board (Narayanamurthy et al. 1997:14).13
management of 38 schemes was retained with
the restructured and downsized WNASA. Around
50 schemes were given over to the private
sector. In one province, a few schemes were
brought under a farmer-management
organization that was formed hastily by the local
political authority. However, in the majority of
the schemes, farmers took up limited rain-fed
cultivation or abandoned cultivation altogether.
The smallholder schemes in the former
homelands of South Africa have a lot in
common with those on the White Nile in
Sudan. Both have: long histories of
dependency on parastatals; extremely high
level of mechanization of smallholder
cultivation; poor infrastructure and institutional
arrangements for input supply and output
marketing for smallholder farmers; comparable
conditions with respect to land-tenure
insecurity and ambiguity about land rights. In
some ways, the Sudanese smallholders were
better off than farmers in South Africa’s former
homelands in that they had access to
institutional credit—albeit very expensive—
under the so called salam (repayment-in-kind
at a predetermined value) contract. Moreover,
in many Sudanese schemes, smallholders had
5–15 hectares each, which is uncommon in
South African schemes. But, then, all White
Nile schemes were pump schemes that doled
out very costly irrigation. Naranayamurthy et
al. (1997) explored the prospects of viable
management of these schemes by WUAs, and
concluded that at current levels of productivity,
irrigation fees account for 20–22 percent of
gross income and total cash-costs of farming
range from 65–90 percent of gross income. As
a result, net returns from wheat, the main
irrigated crop, range from barely US$7/ha to
US$42/ha, excluding taxes and the subsidies
hidden in current water charges.  Further, their
calculations showed that “even if wheat yields
double, the cash surplus will barely suffice to
pay for the fuel to operate the pump.” Their
conclusion: “Merely changing the mode of
management does not necessarily result in
improved performance (and) ... withdrawal of
state management before the necessary support
services are in place and available can be
counterproductive”(ibid, p. 22).
Similar experience is recorded in Zimbabwe.
Assessing the economic viability of six
smallholder irrigation schemes, Shumba and
Maposa (Makhura and Mamabolo 2000) found
that “only one out of the six schemes realized a
profit margin of more than Z$223/month/plot-
holder (which is the minimum wage rate for
agriculture workers) after O&M costs (currently
met by the government) were deducted.”
Constraints on improved viability included
working capital scarcity, unreliable water
supplies, difficulty in accessing inputs, and
limited market outlets and poor roads.
Manzungu et al. (1999) chart the interesting
story of farmer-managed smallholder irrigation in
the Musengezi scheme, which was established
in 1989 by the government of Zimbabwe with
government and Danish International
Development Agency (DANIDA) funding. The
scheme used electric pumps and sprinklers, and
was designed in such a way that all sprinklers
had to be operated simultaneously when the
pump was switched on. One hundred and eight
farmers were settled on 127 hectares with land
sizes ranging from 0.5 to 2 hectares of irrigated
plots and 5 hectares of rain-fed plots. The
scheme idled for the first 4 years due to the
lack of rain, and had to be rehabilitated with
additional external funding. A federal
organization was created with democratically
elected members, but it was not legally
registered. The story of Musengezi scheme is
illustrative of the operation of the “downward
ratchets” in many African smallholder irrigation
schemes.  During a decade of operation, there
was not even a single year when the farmers14
were able to achieve viability and meet, besides
the costs of inputs, the costs of operating the
scheme, which included electricity bills,
maintenance and repair of pumps and
sprinklers. They found new sources of borrowed
funds every year and regularly defaulted. The
propensity to default was attributed partly to
acts of God and partly to their own omissions
and commissions. The original idea was that
farmers would repay the capital costs in
installments and routinely service their O&M
obligation. As it turned out, the installments had
to be paid off by DANIDA. Crop loans provided
by the parastatal remained unpaid. As guarantor
for the farmers, the local member of parliament
had to pay the electricity bills. During 1995–
1999, farmers entered into contract farming
agreements with five different companies. None
of them worked with companies swindling the
farmers some of the time and farmers cheating
the companies rest of the time. In the
meanwhile, for the lack of maintenance, the
pumps and the sprinklers began breaking down
in 1998. And, as a result of not settling the
bills, the power supply was cut off. With a track
record of unpaid debts and unkept contracts, no
bank or company was willing to do business
with the farmers of Musengezi. Manzungu et al.
(1999) concluded: “The schemes with their
heavy reliance on pumps were doomed to be
financially unviable, and thus unsuitable for an
experiment in turnover.”  This is the pathology
of decline in all attempts for farmer
management in the context of low-level
equilibrium and operation of downward ratchets.
Wester et al. (1995) offer an interesting
comparative analysis of state “disengagement”
from smallholder pump irrigation schemes in two
areas of the Senegal Valley. In the Douè
Region, the abrupt withdrawal of SAED’s
comprehensive and subsidized support system
led to the decline of the schemes. But in Ile à
Morphil, a donor-supported project attempted to
cushion the effect of abrupt disengagement and
create farmer organizations to provide the
institutional support.  Wester et al. (1995)
conclude that, “thanks to the project
intervention, the negative impact of
‘disengagement’ was less serious in Ile à
Morphil than in the Douè region.” However,
they also found that the “project faced great
difficulties in organizing farmers to take up
activities formerly performed by the state.”
One reading of their evidence is that it is
particularly more difficult to organize small
farmers in separate bodies, i.e., one to
provide credit, another to supply inputs, and
yet another to maintain pumps, and make
each of these viable and sustainable. It
seems important to devise new, more farmer-
centered institutional models to operate the
“estate-mode of farming” more efficiently and
to the advantage of the farmers.
In our analysis, then, the only way farmer
management of African smallholder irrigation
can be sustainable is for management transfer
to be part of a larger “lift strategy” that can
dramatically enhance economic returns to
smallholder farming. But, such a lift strategy
will have to include much more than just
irrigation management transfer. It will need to
effectively deal with the whole host of
constraints that African smallholder schemes
are facing. As Crosby (2000) has asserted:
“Sustainable irrigation farming is only possible
if the production levels attained make it
affordable. This implies favorable natural
resources, knowledge, motivation, management
and the essential independent support services.”15
Institutional Support Systems for Sustainable Farmer-Management
Throughout Africa, there are hardly any cases
of successful and sustainable farmer-management
in smallholder irrigation schemes; and there are
hardly any cases of institutional failures in
farmer management of irrigation schemes by
Irrigation Boards involving large, commercial
farmers. Putting in bold relief the importance of
upward and downward ratchets in shaping
successful turn over, table 1, based on Tren
and Schurr (2000) summarizes the results of
two Irrigation Boards (Loskop and Hereford) and
two smallholder schemes (Hindostan and
Coetzeesdraai in Arabie-Olifants Scheme) in
South Africa’s Northern Province. In the
smallholder schemes, farmers pay little or
nothing for irrigation, whereas the Irrigation
Board farmers pay for irrigation on a full cost of
O&M basis and they will pay much more for
water itself once the RSA government’s new
full-cost water pricing policy comes into force.
Yet, farmer management in smallholder schemes
is deemed to be a failure, whereas Irrigation
Boards are highly successful.
The most important distinguishing factor is
the stakes of farmers in their farming and in the
irrigation system: farmers in the Irrigation
Boards have reasonably large farms, access to
capital to invest in commercial crops, and
average farm incomes in the range of R 1–2.5
million. Farming is the only or the primary
source of livelihood and income for these
farmers and in their case, the double-
coincidence of need and capacity is well
established. A well-functioning irrigation system
is central to their livelihood (need). They have
the resources, significant interests as well as
the management skills (capacity) for trouble-free
and sustainable management of large systems.
Smallholder groups have neither; their present
tiny farms give them little net income (some
suggest it is negative if full value of family labor
is costed), and they do not have the resources
and management capacity to operate their
schemes viably. A Policy Proposal prepared by
a group of RSA’s most experienced scholars
appropriately asserts that: “Irrigation farming
can be very remunerative provided the following
are present: high quality management, markets
and infrastructure, and sufficient equity
capital”(Backeberg et al. 1996: vii). Africa’s
smallholder irrigation farmers have none of
these; and without these, IMT can easily
become a “millstone around the neck.”
Fortified by strong upward ratchets,
Irrigation Boards of South Africa are able to
take many an adversity in their stride. For
instance, the Central Steelpoort Irrigation Board
is confronted with nitrate contamination of
groundwater and water shortages in the silted
up Steelpoort River, but the irrigation system
stays reasonably well-run, offering a relatively
trouble-free service to its members.  Similarly,
Watervals Irrigation Board is faced with
problems of leaking canals and water shortages,
but the irrigation system performs pretty much
to its design potential. In contrast, the operation
of downward ratchets in smallholder systems is
at the heart of their dependency on public
systems. Recent field research by a group of
researchers at the Agricultural Research
Council-Institute of Agricultural Engineering at
Pretoria (Stimie et al. 2000) in the Steelpoort
River basin puts into bold relief how inability to
commit small expenditures on repair and
maintenance by small farmers in the former
Lebowa territory rendered many irrigation and
drinking water supply systems defunct. Nigeria’s
smallholder schemes began facing as far back
as 1988 the “withdrawal symptoms” that South
African smallholder systems have just begun to
face.
It is evident that farmer management of
smallholder irrigation schemes can become
viable and sustainable, but only as an element
in a broader “lift” strategy that attacks at once
an entire complex of constraints (including16
capital scarcity, low enterprise and risk-taking
capacity, shortage of machines, and poor
market-linkages). From the data available it is
clear that when farmer organizations are
designed to work on this broad array of
constraints rather than just manage the irrigation
system, smallholder schemes in Africa, although
lacking in experience, tend to survive.
The irrigation fee at Saga, the pump
irrigation scheme in Niger that Abernethy et al.
(2000) studied, worked out to a whopping
US$425/ha when converted at PPP rate
11
11Purchasing Power Parity exchange rate.
TABLE 1.
Features of four Irrigation Organizations in the Northern Province, South Africa.
Scheme characteristics Loskop Hereford Hindostan Coetzeesdraai
No. of members 626 42 45 126
Design command (ha) 16,110 3,426 56 158
Actual command area (ha) 33,000 3,426 56 158
Average farm size (ha) 35 81.5 1.25 1.25
Range of farm sizes (ha) 30–40 5–900 1.25 1.25
Water right(m3/ha) 7,700 7,700
Nature of the irrigation system Gravity flow; Gravity flow; Pump lift      Pump lift
individual sluices individual storage
tanks
Main crops Wheat: 25%
Citrus and Grapes: 24%
Cotton and Tobacco: 36%
Vegetables: 15%                                    Winter Wheat,Maize
Water application technology Flood/furrow irrigation? Drip, sprinkler, Overhead Overhead
center pivot from irrigation irrigation
85 storage dams  sprays  sprays
Range of farm sizes (ha) 30–40 5–900 1.25 1.25
Present  water fee (R/ha) 24.30 150 0 0
Estimated full cost of irrigation (R/ha) 539 308 600 600
Wheat yield mt/ha (net margin, R/ha) 5.5 (2,045) 5.5 (2,045) 2.5 (14.4) 1.5 (-1,035)
Maize yield mt/ha (net margin, R/ha) 8 (2,276) 8 (2,276) 8(3,846) 6 (2,021)
Tobacco yield mt/ha (net margin, R/ha) 2.2 (4,800) 2.2 (4,800) Nil Nil
Citrus yield mt/ha (net margin, R/ha) 45 (54,000) 45 (54,000) Nil Nil
Estimated net farm income (R) / farm/ year 1.1 M 2.8 M 2,000a 1,100a
Other income/ farm household Nil Nil 6,600b 6,600b
Irrigation Cost / farmer without subsidy  (R/ha) 18,865 25,102 (0.9%) 600 600
Full cost water fee as % of Gross <1% <1% >12% >16%
income/farmer
Full cost water fee as % of (Gross 1.5% 1% >30% >35%
income- cash input costs)
a These figures of net margin contain the family labor wage component; so the actual margin is smaller than this.
b State Pension.
Source: Tren and Schurr 2000.
Note: R = South African Rand17
(compared with Niger’s per capita income of
US$750 at PPP rate) and exceeded 20 percent
of the gross value of output. Nevertheless the
scheme survived because irrigated farming,
despite high irrigation fees, is a profitable
proposition. The net revenue derived per person,
per day of family labor in irrigated farming is
2.19 times the market wage rate (Abernethy et al.
2000:20). Another reason is that the
organizations that manage the schemes are
integrated rice-producing cooperatives, that
provide farmers inputs on credit as well as
market their outputs. In effect, then, irrigation
charges also absorb some of the overheads of
other services provided, which makes the
smallholder irrigated farming enterprise viable as
a whole. Similarly, in the much talked about
Mwea scheme in Kenya with 60,000 people
subsisting on a command area of 6,000
hectares, a major revival of the stagnating
scheme is being spearheaded not by an IMT
initiative but by an agribusiness intervention by
Mwea Rice Growers Multipurpose Cooperative
(MRGM). The MRGM has taken over the
management of the irrigation scheme from the
National Irrigation Board, the parastatal that has
been managing irrigation schemes, besides
running a rice production monopoly (Muerto and
Kabutha nd).
If the Burkinabe and Nigerian smallholder
irrigation systems are still able to survive after
turnover, it is because they collect US$50–270
per hectare season toward irrigation, a level of
water fee unheard of in smallholder irrigation
outside Africa. And if farmers still participate in
irrigated farming, it is because the Water Users
Associations provide a range of nonirrigation
services to members, such as supply of
fertilizers and seed, especially in remote
locations where farmers do not have access to
markets. “Some associations also have
equipment for hire to members, some organize
common rice nurseries, some perform land
preparation for members’ land, and some
organize marketing and purchase crops from
their members for transport and sale.
Associations generate income not only from
water fees but also from fines, profit on input
sales, hiring of equipment and marketing of rice”
(Abernethy and Sally 1999: 212).
In South Africa, there are sugar projects
where smallholders enjoying access to a
broad-based credit, input supply and market
access, have been able to take in their stride
the hassle and costs of farmer-managed
irrigation. In a rare such case, Pike (Makhura
and Mamabolo 2000) has analyzed how the
Small Grower Development Trust, a bottom-up
farmer organization, has evolved a unique clutch
of financial, training and other support
services, which lie at the heart of the success
of some 42,000 smallholder sugarcane growers
in Natal/Kwazulu and KaNgwane regions. And,
for the purposes of this analysis, it matters
little that these sugar projects are selling sugar
at twice the world price. These exceptions prove
the rule that even small-scale, resource-poor
farmers will manage their irrigation schemes
provided these offer the promise of viability
and livelihood improvement. Straightforward
IMT clearly does not offer this promise for the
simple reason that most of the schemes would
not have been built—at least, not built the way
they were, if their planners/designers had
originally planned them for management by the
smallholders.
In sum, then, plain IMT—with all the accent
on “process,” capacity building, getting the right
socio-technical conditions in place, and so
on—is by itself unlikely to work in the context
of African smallholder schemes.  Successful
IMT will have to be accompanied by a quantum
jump in smallholder productivity and incomes;
and unless communities feel confident about
managing these schemes viably, they will be
reluctant to accept IMT. In South Africa, for
example, the government of the Northern
Province has selected 11 schemes for IMT on a18
pilot basis. The most promising among these
are Dingleydale and New Forest schemes where
the cost of rehabilitation is estimated at
R 3,000/ha compared to net income per hectare
of R 13,000. Being gravity schemes, farmers
should be confident and happy to take over their
management. But according to Merle and Oudot
(nd) who interviewed farmers in the schemes
about the prospects of management transfer,
“Farmers feel distraught, facing the removal of
every kind of support (tractor, inputs supply,
marketing etc.)... (and) progressive removal of
all the rules on the scheme: rules concerning
land, water, cattle and people.” Northern
Province Department of Agriculture, Land and
Environment (NPDALE) estimates that the
income per hectare in these schemes can
increase to over R 28,000 with sufficient water
and to R 63,000 if commercial production levels
are achieved. There seems little doubt that
smallholders making R 63,000/ha from irrigated
farming will be far keener to manage and
finance their irrigation schemes that sustain
household incomes of this level. But
approaching anywhere near this potential will
require much more than smooth transfer of
these irrigation schemes to farmers. It entails
removing a host of other constraints.
The Way Forward
IMT worldwide has been overlooked, if the
analysis by Lexton, Venn and Associates (2000:
pp. 2–5) is any guide.
However, in our assessment, besides
getting the process right, South Africa—and the
rest of Africa—also need to focus on evolving
the right IMT strategy that addresses the entire
complex of constraints that smallholder irrigation
schemes are facing, replacing the so-called
downward ratchets by strong upward ones. In
order to do this the tenor of discourse in the
whole of African smallholder irrigation context
needs to shift from institutional reform of
smallholder irrigation management to institutional
intervention designed to significantly enhance
smallholder productivity and incomes.
Institutions appropriate for this are probably not
pure Water Users Associations (for example,
the Irrigation Boards), but either farmer-
controlled organizations with a much bigger
mandate and capacity, or strong institutional
linkages with agribusinesses to play a central
role in executing a lift strategy.
Regrettably, there are not many examples of
such broad-based smallholder support systems
Under intense budgetary pressure to curtail
expenditures on O&M, many African countries
have taken recourse to plain abandonment of
smallholder schemes, which have gradually
collapsed. In South Africa, the latest to initiate
state withdrawal, this implies virtually writing off,
as sunk costs, over R 2 billion of past
investments of public funds in the smallholder
irrigation sector. Instead of abandonment,
however, South Africa has chosen a more
positive and proactive stance towards the
management of state withdrawal from
smallholder irrigation schemes. According to
NPDALE (1999), the macropolicy of the
Northern Province Department of Agriculture,
Land and Environment is “to create an enabling
environment through which beneficiaries can, by
means of a systematic take-over program,
assume full responsibility and control of these
schemes in a sustainable manner.”  We found
the turnover program being piloted on a first
group of 11 of the 171 schemes in the Northern
Province extremely process-savy. Hardly any of
the process-related conditions for success that
have been identified by researchers studying19
firm, Capstan Group, identified 27 smallholder
projects from which they hoped to export
700,000 cartons of citrus produced by
smallholders in 2000 (Nufarmer and African
Entrepreneur: 2000:20).
Africa is replete with many examples of
contract farming that have failed, but it is not
clear if the potential offered by this institutional
alternative has been explored fully, especially in
the context of smallholder irrigation schemes.
Doing this is important because in the African
smallholder irrigation context, agribusiness
companies have operated farmer support
systems akin to what the erstwhile parastatals
were originally to offer. In a recent article,
Coulter et al. (1999) have explored “contract
default,” both by the company as well as the
farmers, as the major impediment to developing
the agribusiness path to smallholder farming.
They have suggested that one reason why
farmers as well as companies default on their
commitments is that the farmers are not
organized. According to them, when Companies
make input supply, credit and marketing
commitments to a self-help group or a
cooperative of small farmers, peer-pressure can
be made to work to check individual default.
Equally, organized groups of small farmers with
their superior bargaining power can extract more
favorable terms for contract farming and guard
against company defaults. With organized small
farmer groups, there is also room to design and
introduce self-enforcing incentives and penalties
with respect to honoring of the contract, thereby
reducing drastically the monitoring and contract
enforcement costs that scares agribusiness
companies away from smallholders.
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In conclusion, our review of global and
African experience suggests that nowhere in
that have succeeded and proved sustainable,
especially in Africa. But we can suggest that
central to an effective lift strategy for African
smallholder communities is to help them find
stable, reliable markets for value-added
products; once this is ensured, much else
follows. The sugar projects funded by the
Department of Agriculture in Kwa-Zulu-Natal
have been far more successful than smallholder
irrigation schemes elsewhere “largely due to
better support services and a readily available
market” (Bembridge 1999:6). There are also
scattered emerging examples of smallholder
irrigation communities that have successfully
created their own new upward ratchets. One
such community is a group of smallholders
at the Hereford farm in the Arabi-Olifants,
Northern Province in South Africa.  With timely
and intelligent support from Africare, a
nongovernmental organization, some of these
farmers were able to develop a contract-farming
arrangement for vegetables for a wholesaler that
exports to Hong Kong and France as well as
supplying South Africa’s national market. The
Hereford smallholders rapidly learnt to grow
quality vegetables following a strict planting
program provided by the company, and to their
delight, found their farm incomes soaring. This
year, when we visited them, we found that the
company has offered to include more of the
Hereford smallholders in the contract.
Particularly in South Africa, with a dynamic
agribusiness sector, opportunities for such
collaboration between agribusiness and
smallholder irrigators may offer a big window of
opportunity for enabling the latter to grow and
take over the management of irrigation.  Many
such agribusiness firms have a special
commitment to support smallholders. One such
12Our brief experience of exploring cotton farming in Arabie-Olifants Scheme under contract with LONRHO suggested an important opportunity
wasted. Veeplaats farmers we met did not have a clearly formed assessment since it was their first year with LONRHO. Naturally, in all contract
farming, productive, inventive and disciplined farmers gain much more than lazy, sloppy and the risk-averse. Accordingly, we did find that some
of the Veeplaats farmers would do very well with this contract and that over time, if the average performance could be improved, such a contract
might be the “win-win” arrangement that could work best. Unfortunately, we understand, most farmers defaulted on their repayment obligations
and LONHRO has withdrawn from credit and input supply facilty although it is still willing to buy their produce (Shah and van Koppen 1999).20
Africa is there a significant body of positive
experience to suggest that straightforward IMT
will work in smallholder irrigation as it has with
large, commercial farmers of USA, Mexico,
Turkey, New Zealand and Columbia. Indeed, it
would be surprising if IMT, with its stress on
“process” and capacity building, will meet even
the moderated expectation of IMT success, that
it “saves the government money, improves
cost-effectiveness of operation and maintenance
while improving, or at least not weakening, the
productivity of irrigated agriculture.” (Vermillion
1996:153). This is because of the entire
complex of institutional constraints that raises
important questions about the viability of most
smallholder farming itself, leave alone irrigation
systems. Institutional alternatives that have the
greatest chance to work in this situation are
those that help smallholders move to a
substantially higher trajectory of productivity and
income from where they can take in their stride
the additional cost and responsibility of
managing their irrigation system. And the best
place to start seems to be markets; bring
smallholder communities in contact with stable,
reliable markets for value-added products. This
will help install upward ratchets and once their
irrigated holdings help them make decent
livelihoods, African smallholders will be ready
and eager for IMT.21
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